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PREVIEW; Reavis v. Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance
Agency d/b/a Fedloan Servicing: Just what is a “disclosure” anyway?
Dillon Kato
The Montana Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral argument on
this matter May 20, 2020 at 9:30 a.m. in the Courtroom of the Montana
Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek Justice Building, Helena, Montana.
Robert Farris-Olsen or David Wilson are likely to appear for the Appellant
James Reavis (“Reavis”), and Kenneth Lay or Brett Clark are likely to
appear for the Appellee the Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance
Agency (“PHEAA”).
I.

INTRODUCTION

This case raises the issue of whether the federal Higher Education
Act preempts claims under Montana statutory or common law against a
student loan servicing company for allegedly fraudulent or misleading
statements made to a borrower.1 Courts around the country are split on the
question, and the Montana Supreme Court’s decision could have important
implications for student loan borrowers in the state.
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Reavis took out student loans to fund his pair of graduate degrees.2
He later consolidated his loans to ensure they qualified for the Public
Student Loan Forgiveness program, under which a borrower can have the
remaining balance of loans forgiven after making 120 qualifying payments
(while working as a public servant).3 Following his graduation in 2012,
Reavis began working at the Montana Office of the Public Defender, and
asserts that by the time he filed suit, he had made 65 qualifying payments.4

Candidate for J.D. 2021, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of
Montana.
1
Appellant’s Opening Br. at 2, Reavis v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assist. Agency (Mont.
Dec. 16, 2019) (DA 19-0510); Br. of Appellee at 1, Reavis v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assist.
Agency (Mont. Feb. 14, 2020) (DA 19-0510).
2
Appellant’s Opening Br., supra note 1, at 4; Br. of Appellee, supra note 1, at 6.
3
Appellant’s Opening Br., supra note 1, at 4; Br. of Appellee, supra note 1, at 3-4
(referencing the requirements of loan forgiveness in 34 U.S.C. § 685.219(c)).
4
Appellant’s Opening Br., supra note 1, at 5.
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However, Reavis claims, among other things, that the PHEAA, the
servicer of his loans, has underrepresented the number of payments he has
made and given him conflicting information on the amounts he must pay.5
Reavis filed suit against PHEAA on August 8, 2018, alleging
violations of the Montana Consumer Protection Act, negligence,
misrepresentation, and fraud, and sought declaratory relief conclusively
establishing the number of payments he had made as of a certain date.6
PHEAA responded by filing a pair of motions to dismiss, the second based
on the argument that Reavis’ claims were preempted under the federal
Higher Education Act.7 On August 14, 2019—just over a year after the
filing of the initial complaint—Judge Michael McMahon of the Montana
First Judicial District Court dismissed Reavis’ case, finding his claims
expressly preempted under federal law, specifically 20 U.S.C. § 1098g.8
Reavis appeals.
III.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A.

Reavis’ Arguments

Reavis argues the District Court erred in finding express preemption
of his claims under federal law, and asserts that to reach any contrary
conclusion would “deprive Reavis, and all Montana student loan
borrowers, of a remedy when servicers make false statements.”9
Under federal law: “Loans made, insured, or guaranteed pursuant to
a program authorized under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965
shall not be subject to any disclosure requirements of any state law.”10
Reavis’ argument on appeal is that this law only expressly preempts
state laws “that require specific disclosures, but it does not preempt tort

5
Appellant’s Opening Br., supra note 1, at 6; Br. of Appellee, supra note 1, at 6-7 (“Reavis
disagrees with PHEAA’s provisional counts and believes that he has made some larger number of
qualifying payments.”).
6
Appellant’s Opening Br., supra note 1, at 2-3; Br. of Appellee, supra note 1, at 1, 7
(“Simply put, Reavis wants the District Court to force PHEAA to modify the qualifying payments
counts that have been previously disclosed to him.”).
7
Appellant’s Opening Br., supra note 1, at 3; Br. of Appellee, supra note 1, at 2.
8
Appellant’s Opening Br., supra note 1, at 3.
9
Id. at 12.
10
20 U.S.C. § 1098g (emphasis added).
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claims or statutory claims based on affirmative misrepresentations.”11 In
this case, the request being made is that PHEAA “speak truthfully, nondeceptively and non-fraudulently” and Reavis argues doing so is not
requiring a new type of disclosure be made.12 Reavis draws a distinction
between a “disclosure” which he claims is a more specific term of the loan,
and a “communication” between the servicer and borrower, saying the
latter is at stake here.13 The district court, Reavis argues, erred in part by
relying on authority from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and a federal
district court (since overruled by the Eleventh Circuit) in siding with
PHEAA.14
Because PHEAA has a “responsibility . . . to track the number of
qualifying payment[s]”15 and the plain meaning of “disclosure
requirements” and the “majority of cases interpreting the phrase” agree
with Reavis, he asks the Court to overturn the lower court’s decision.16 In
support of his argument, Reavis claims a presumption against preemption
exists when Congress has not made it clear it is preempting state law, such
as in the case of § 1098g.17 Further, Reavis argues the lower court erred in
relying on an interpretation of the scope of § 1098g issued by the U.S.
Department of Education (which favors PHEAA’s argument), because the
conclusion of the department—that the federal loan program was intended
to provide a uniform national standard and preempts state laws—is not
universally recognized as a goal Congress had.18
Agencies and organizations including the Montana Attorney
General’s office, Montana Federation of Public Employees, Montana
Legal Services Association, Veterans Education Success, National
Consumer Law Center and the Student Borrower Protection Center filed
amicus briefs in this case supporting Reavis’ arguments on appeal.
Reavis believes the issue of conflict preemption should not be
decided by the Court, arguing that the issue cannot be raised for the first

Appellant’s Opening Br., supra note 1, at 8.
Appellant’s Opening Br., supra note 1, at 16; Appellant’s Reply Br., at 2, Reavis v.
Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assist. Agency (Mont. April 10, 2020) (DA 19-0510).
13
Appellant’s Opening Br., supra note 1, at 17-18.
14
Id. at 9.
15
Id., at 11.
16
Id. at 13.
17
Id. at 13.
18
Appellant’s Opening Br., supra note 1, at 28, 30.
11
12
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time on appeal.19 However, Reavis argues that should the Court reach the
issue, conflict preemption does not apply to his claims because it is
“completely possible for [PHEAA] to both properly account for [Reavis’]
payments and provide the required disclosures without undermining the
purpose of the [Higher Education Act].”20 Even if the Court does find
uniformity to be the purpose of the Higher Education Act, Reavis contends
his case survives because a prohibition on false statements of material fact
does not impinge on any purpose of uniformity, because accounting for a
borrower’s payments is one of the roles of a loan servicer.21
B.

PHEAA’s Arguments

PHEAA contends that the district court correctly concluded that
Reavis’ claims were expressly preempted by the Higher Education Act and
in particular 20 U.S.C. § 1098g.22 Additionally, PHEAA believes the
claims are also barred by conflict preemption because they interfere with
the federal government’s goals in creating a federal student loan program
with a uniform process for administering and servicing loans, an issue
raised in its briefing in the lower court but not addressed by the district
court’s dismissal ruling.23
On the express preemption front, PHEAA rests its argument on the
“any disclosure requirements of any state law” prohibition of 20 U.S.C. §
1098g.24 Because Reavis, in seeking a declaratory judgment forcing
PHEAA to determine and report that the borrower had made a certain
number of qualifying payments under the loan forgiveness loan, it
contends that such a report would be a disclosure requirement expressly
prohibited under federal statute.25 Agreeing with the district court’s
determination that “claims that [PHEAA] provided [Reavis] inaccurate
information or no information [are] no different than a claim that
[PHEAA] failed to make proper disclosures”26PHEAA says all of Reavis’
claims essentially boil down to the same concept: “[Reavis] wants to use

19

Id. at 14 n.4.
Appellant’s Reply Br., supra note 12, at 2, 12.
21
Id. at 13, 15.
22
Br. of Appellee, supra note 1, at 9.
23
Id.
24
Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. 1098g) (emphasis added).
25
Id. at 9-10.
26
Id. at 11 (quoting Order on Defendants’ Dismissal Motions at 7, DV-2018-833).
20

2020

PREVIEW: Reavis v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ.

122

state law to require PHEAA to tell him something different than what it
has previously told him.”27
Because courts should look first to the language of a statute in
determining the law’s meaning,28 and the plain meaning of the phrase “any
disclosure requirement” is purposefully broad,29 “if a claim is brought
under a state statutory regime and used to establish legal obligations on an
HEA-contracted student loan servicer . . . that claim imposes a ‘disclosure
requirement’ in violation of § 1098g.”30 Reavis bolsters its argument by
pointing out that the U.S. Supreme Court has found that the term
“requirements” extends to liability under common law.31
Because Reavis’ claims are that PHEAA should give him additional
or different information than what he has already received, it contends this
new information would constitute a disclosure, which under the federal
statute would be prohibited by express preemption.32
The district court relied on a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision
on the same issue33 in ruling in favor of PHEAA, and while such a decision
by a federal circuit is not binding, PHEAA argues the Montana Supreme
Court has a policy of giving Ninth Circuit opinions deference.34
Reavis’ wish for a presumption against preemption is not appropriate,
PHEAA contends, because there is an express preemption clause written
into § 1098g,35 and that any state interest in regulating consumer protection
does not prevent express preemption by Congress.36 Also, PHEAA says
the U.S. Department of Education’s interpretation of § 1098g (in its favor)

27

Br. of Appellee, supra note 1, at 22.
Id., at 12 (citing Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992).
29
Id. at 16 (“‘Disclosure’ means ‘[t]he act or process of making known something that was
previously unknown; a revelation of facts.’ Black’s Law Dictionary, 562 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 10th
3d., Thompson Reuters 2014) . . . [T]he term ‘requirement’ . . . is ‘[s]omething that must be done
because of a law or rule; something legally imposed, called for, or demanded; an imperative
command”).
30
Id.
31
Id. (citing Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 324 (2008)).
32
Br. of Appellee, supra note 1, at 24 (“if a communication conveys, reveals . . . information
or facts, it is a disclosure”).
33
Chae v. SLM Corporation, 593 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2010).
34
Br. of Appellee, supra note 1, at 25 (citing MacPheat v. Mahoney, 997 P.2d 753, 758
(Mont. 2000) (“[T]he Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision should be given deference”)).
35
Id. at 17 (citing Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1946
(2016)).
36
Id. at 18.
28
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should be given deference by the Court in deciding whether to apply the
statute to Reavis’ claims.37
Disputing that a rejection of his claims due to express preemption
leaves Reavis and those like him with no recourse, PHEAA points to a
complaint process under which borrowers can file grievances against their
loan servicers with the U.S. Department of Education, but also concludes
that “The language Congress chose reflects its intent to preclude state law
civil actions—even where those actions might deny consumers the ability
to seek recourse through the courts.”38 Further, the number of payments
PHEAA has said Reavis has made is merely a preliminary determination,
and the final determination of whether a borrower is eligible for
forgiveness is not made until they submit a claim to the U.S. Department
of Education after believing they had made enough qualifying payments.39
Turning to conflict preemption, PHEAA contends that Congress
“intended a uniform system for federal loan servicing” and that allowing
borrowers to bring claims under varying state laws would “invade the
uniquely federal interests associated with federal student loan servicing.”40
Although the lower court did not address the conflict preemption argument
in dismissing the case, PHEAA (contrary to Reavis) believes the issue can
still be raised on appeal because both parties addressed the issue in their
lower court briefing.41
PHEAA believes Congress’ goal in establishing the Direct Loan and
loan forgiveness programs was to have a national set of “clear, uniform
standards” for servicing loans,42 that the federal law has a set of uniform
disclosures loan servicers must make43 and specifies that a borrower’s
redress for failure to receive those disclosures is not a claim for civil
damages but rather to report to the U.S. Department of Education.44
Calling Reavis’ case a “perfect example” of how a state law would
interfere with the uniform administration of the national student loan
37

Id. at 32-33 (citing Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 576-77 (2009)).
Id. at 20.
39
Br. of Appellee, supra note 1, at 22.
40
Id. at 10.
41
Id. at 36 n.3.
42
Id. at 37 (citing Chae v. SLM Corporation, 593 F.3d 936, 944-45 (9th Cir. 2010)
(“Congress’s instructions to [USDOE] on how to implement the student-loan statutes carry this
unmistakable command: Establish a set of rules that will apply across the board”)).
43
20 U.S.C. § 1083(e), see also § 1019b(a)(2), § 1019c(a), § 1078e(i), § 1082(1).
44
Br. of Appellee, supra note 1, at 40 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1083e).
38
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program, with “courts across the nation . . . weigh[ing] in under a variety
of state laws” should his argument prevail, PHEAA contends that the state
claims must also be found barred under conflict preemption.45
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

Express Preemption

The Court’s analysis of the express preemption argument will likely
turn on two questions: Does requiring a loan servicer to provide accurate
information (including having to correct previously issued information)
constitute a “disclosure” at all? And if so, does such a requirement fall
under Congress’ meaning in § 1098g that prohibits “any disclosure
requirements” under state law?
Because courts have been split on the meaning of “any disclosure
requirements” in § 1098g, the term could be determined to be vague
enough to not constitute an express preemption, leading the Court to look
at the case with a presumption against finding preemption.46
It’s likely the Court will find that § 1098g does not expressly preempt
the types of claims Reavis is making to the extent that a borrower could
use state or common law claims to force a loan servicer to give accurate
accounts when the company makes a report to the borrower. To answer
the first question, the Court could follow the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals in Nelson v. Great Lakes Educ. Loan Servs. in determining that
providing accurate information when already providing such information
is not an additional “disclosure,” a term that refers instead to “core terms
of the loan at origination as well as before and during repayment.”47 As an
extension, having to correct previously issued erroneous information
likewise would not be considered a disclosure. The Nelson court also
found the DoE’s interpretation “not persuasive,” citing that it “is not
particularly thorough” and was a change to the department’s prior
litigation positions.48

45

Id. at 42.
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 334 (2008) (“Federal law containing a preemption
clause do not automatically escape the presumption against preemption”).
47
Nelson v. Great Lakes Educ. Loan Servs., 928 F.3d 639, 643 (7th Cir. 2019).
48
Id. at 651 n.2.
46
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Although the Ninth Circuit has decided a case on the issue at hand49
and PHEAA points to precedent that such opinions—though not
binding—should be given deference by the Court, Reavis correctly
counters that the Court will not follow “poorly reasoned Ninth Circuit
decision.”50 Chae, the Ninth Circuit case that is the primary foundation of
PHEAA’s arguments and which was also cited by the District Court, does
itself draw a distinction between different types of claims (under the loan
system that predated the one at issue in Reavis) while finding express
preemption applied to some. Most importantly, the Chae court found that
claims including the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, as well as fraudulent and deceptive practices “are not impacted by
any of the [former loan program’s] express preemption provisions”51 with
Reavis concluding that its holding does not actually support the District
Court’s result.52 However, these remaining claims that weren’t found to be
expressly preempted in Chae were still found to be preempted under
conflict preemption.53
Additionally, after briefing was completed in this case, another of the
cases (a federal district court decision) relied on by PHEAA—which itself
rested on the lower court opinion in Nelson before the Seventh Circuit
reversed it—was reversed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.54
Should the Court take this route in finding no express preemption,
the underlying dispute over just how many qualified payments Reavis has
made is still unresolved, and the matter would be remanded for further
proceedings.
B.

Conflict Preemption

Should the Court find that Reavis’ claims were not expressly
preempted by federal law, it is likely to remand the case for a further
determination regarding the issue of conflict preemption. While conflict
preemption was addressed in the parties briefing at both the District Court
level and on appeal, the lower court made no finding on the issue in ruling
49

Chae v. SLM Corp., 593 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2010).
Appellant’s Opening Br., supra note 1, at 26-27 (citing State v. Robinson, 712 P.2d 754,
759–60 (Mont. 2003)).
51
Chae, 593 F.3d at 943.
52
Appellant’s Opening Br., supra note 1, at 26.
53
Chae, 593 F.3d at 950.
54
Lawson-Ross v. Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp., 955 F.3d 908 (11th Cir. 2020).
50
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in favor of PHEAA. A remand following a conclusion that there was no
express preemption might be coupled with a request for the District Court
to determine if conflict preemption applies to Reavis’ claims seeking
accurate representation of the number of payments he has made.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Court’s decision in Reavis could have major implications for
student loan borrowers across the state. Should the Court choose to side
with PHEAA and uphold the lower court’s decision, it is certainly possible
the lack of remedy when servicers “mislead [borrowers], fail to account
for their payments, or even maliciously deceive them” could come to
pass.55

55

Appellant’s Opening Br., supra note 1, at 32.

